In 2014, a new security de nition of a revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) with signing key exposure resistance was introduced. Based on this new de nition, many scalable RIBS schemes with signing key exposure resistance were proposed. However, the security of these schemes is based on traditional complexity assumption, which is not secure against attacks in the quantum era. Lattice-based cryptography has many attractive features, and it is believed to be secure against quantum computing attacks. We reviewed existing lattice-based RIBS schemes and found that all these schemes are vulnerable to signing key exposure. Hence, in this paper, we propose the rst lattice-based RIBS scheme with signing key exposure resistance by using the left-right lattices and delegation technology. In addition, we employ a complete subtree revocation method to ensure our construction meeting scalability. Finally, we prove that our RIBS scheme is selective-ID existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-sID-CMA) under the standard short integer solutions (SIS) assumption in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Nowadays, dynamic management systems are becoming increasingly popular in enterprises and schools. A common operation in these systems is deleting users. Although many works with e cient revocation mechanisms have been proposed for public key cryptography, and only a few studies have been conducted on identity-based cryptography, which uses a user's identity as his/her public key. Boneh and Franklin [1] proposed an approach to revoke users in an identity-based setting, but this results in a heavy computation overhead at the key generation center (KGC). In order to reduce the KGC's overhead, Boldyreva et al. [2] employed a binary tree to propose the rst scalable revocable identitybased encryption (RIBE) scheme, in which the overhead of the KGC is logarithmically increased based on the number of users. All subsequent scalable RIBE schemes [3] [4] [5] followed Boldyreva et al.'s basic framework and security model. However, in 2013, Seo and Emura [6] found that all existing Boldyreva-based scalable RIBE schemes are vulnerable to decryption key exposure. ey then improved the de nition and security model of RIBE and proposed the rst scalable RIBE with decryption key exposure resistance. Meanwhile, they also introduced a new security de nition of an RIBS with signing key exposure resistance and proposed the rst scalable RIBS scheme. In 2013, Tsai et al. studied the revocation problem in identity-based signatures and proposed the rst revocable identity-based signature (RIBS) scheme from bilinear pairings. All subsequent RIBS schemes [7] [8] [9] were constructed based on Tsai's de nition and security model. Unfortunately, these RIBS schemes are also vulnerable to signing key exposure attacks. It is worth noting that the security of all abovementioned RIBS schemes are based on the traditional complexity problem, namely, the Di e-Hellman problem. Hence, these schemes would not be secure against attacks from quantum computers. Latticebased cryptography has many attractive features, and it is believed to be secure against attacks using quantum computers. In 2015, Xinyin [10] utilized a complete subtree structure to propose the rst lattice-based RIBS scheme, which adopts secret channels to send periodic time update keys. Since the update keys are transmitted in a secret way, they can avoid signing key exposure. Recently, Hung et al. [11] employed the rejection sampling technique [12] to propose a new latticed-based RIBS scheme. eir scheme has a better performance in terms of signature size, signing key size, and the revocation mechanism with public channels. However, the KGC's overhead increases linearly with the number of users, which results in issues with scalability. Moreover, their scheme cannot avoid signing key exposure. As far as we know, there is no lattice-based scalable RIBS scheme with signing key exposure resistance and the update keys are regularly sent over public channels.
Our Contributions.
e main contributions of our paper are summarized as follows: (1) We study the approach used to achieve signing key exposure resistance in Seo et al.'s RIBS scheme and adopt Agrawal et al.'s left-right lattices and delegation technology to propose the first lattice-based RIBS scheme with signing key resistance (2) We then set all the parameters to ensure our construction's correctness and prove that our construction is selective-ID existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-sID-CMA) under the standard short integer solutions (SIS) assumption (3) Our revocation mechanism employs Boldyreva et al.'s binary tree structure to meet scalability needs and ensures that the KGC does not need to send periodic time update keys over secret channels [9] and also constructed an RIBS scheme in the standard model with strong unforgeability and signing key exposure resistance. And Zhao et al. [22] also proposed a communication-efficient RIBS scheme from multilinear maps. However, all of them cannot resist quantum attacks. In 2015, Xinyin [10] proposed an RIBS scheme based on lattices, but the revocable functionality channel is secret. en, Hung et al. [11] proposed an RIBS scheme based on NTRU lattices, in which the KGC sends regular update keys in public channels. One limitation of their scheme is that it is vulnerable to decryption key exposure. erefore, no lattice-based scalable RIBS schemes with signing key exposure resistance have been proposed so far. e rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present some important preliminaries. In Section 3, we present the definition and security model of the RIBS. In Section 4, based on Agrawal et al. 's left-right lattices and delegation technology, we construct a concrete scalable RIBS scheme and prove that our construction meets the EUF-sID-CMA security standards. In Section 5, we give some comparisons with previous works in terms of functionalities. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
2.1. Notation. Z q is a ring of integers modulo q and represents integers in (− q/2, q/2], where q ≥ 2. Z n×m q is a set of n × m matrices, in which the elements are in Z q . ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x. Matrix A T is the transpose of A, and ‖A‖ represents the norm of a matrix A which is defined as the largest norm of its columns. Given matrix B, B and ‖B‖ are B's Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization and Gram-Schmidt norm.
Lattices
Definition 1. Given prime q, A ∈ Z n×m q , and u ∈ Z n q , define following lattices:
Let ρ σ,c (x) ≔ exp(− π‖x − c‖ 2 /σ 2 ) be the standard Gaussian function with center c and variance σ. For a lattice Λ and all the Λ's points x, define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ as D Λ,σ,c (x) ≔ ρ σ,c (x)/ρ σ,c (Λ). For ease of notation, we use D Λ,σ as D Λ,σ,0 's abbreviate. e following lemma from [23, 24] is very useful for our construction.
e following fact from [23] will be used in our security proof. Lemma 2. Given n, positive prime q, m ≥ 2n log q, and
2.3. Some Algorithms. We first recall an algorithm investigated by [24] [25] [26] , which generates a random lattice A ∈ Z n×m q and Λ ⊥ q (A)'s short basis T A . e following lemma derived from [23] shows that the algorithm can convert any full-rank set of vectors in a lattice to a basis efficiently and meanwhile cannot increase the norm of the Gram-Schmidt vectors.
Lemma 4. Given a l-dimensional lattice Λ's arbitrary basis B
and a full-rank set S ∈ Λ, there exist a deterministic algorithm that can convert S to T and for all i
Another two algorithms in [27] will be used to construct and prove our following scheme, respectively. 
e following two algorithms from [28] will be also used to construct and prove our following scheme respectively.
Lemma 7. Given a rank n matrix
Lemma 8. Let m > 2n log q and q > 2 be a prime. For all but at most a q − n fraction of rank n matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , algorithm SampleRwithBasis(A) outputs a matrix R ∈ Z m×m sampled from a distribution statistically close to D m×m . e generated basis
Norm of Random Matrix.
e following definition from [28] defines a distribution on matrices with low norm and defines an algorithm to sample these matrices.
. Algorithm SampleR(1 m ) samples matrices in Z m×m and their distributions are statistically close to D m×m .
Small Integer Solution Problem
Definition 3 (SIS). For any n ∈ Z and any function m ≔ m(n), q ≔ q(n), and β ≔ β(n), given an integer q, a uniform and random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a real number β ∈ R, the average-case SIS q,n,m,β is the problem of finding a nonzero integer vector s ∈ Z m \ 0 { } satisfying As � 0 mod q and ‖s‖ ≤ β.
It has been proved by Micciancio and Regev [29] that for certain parameters, the average-case SIS q,n,m,β problem is as hard as approximating to the worst-case shortest independent vector problem within certain c � β · O( � n √ ) factors.
Encoding Identities or Times as Matrices.
In our following scheme, we use an injective encoding function H: Z n q ⟶ Z n×n q to map identities or times in Z n q to matrices in Z n×n q , whose concrete construction can be found in [27] .
Definition 4. Given a prime q and a positive integer n,
which is an encoding with full-rank differences (FRD) that satisfies the following:
Definition of RIBS Scheme
In this section, we give the formal definition of the syntax and the security model of RIBS derived in [6] . First, we give the syntax of the RIBS scheme. An RIBS scheme consists of seven algorithms (Setup, PriKeyGen, KeyUpd, SignKeyGen, Sign, Verify, and KeyRev). Let U, I, and T be a message space, an identity space, and a time space, respectively.
Definition 5 (syntax of RIBS).
Setup(1 λ , N) takes a security parameter λ and a maximal number of users N as input and outputs the public parameters PP which includes the message space U, a master secret key MSK, a revocation list RL (initially empty), and a state ST. is is a stateful algorithm and run by the key authority. PriKeyGen(PP, MSK, id) takes the public parameters PP, the master secret key MSK, and an identity id ∈ I as input and outputs a private key SK id and an updated state ST.
is is stateful and also run by the key authority. KeyUpd(PP, MSK, t, RL, and ST) takes the public parameters PP, the master secret key MSK, a time t ∈ T, the current revocation list RL, and the state ST as input and outputs a update key KU t . is is run by the key authority. SignKeyGen(SK id , KU t ) takes a private key SK id and an update key KU t as input and outputs a signing key SK id,t or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that id was revoked.
is is a probabilistic algorithm and run by the signer. Sign(PP, id, t, SK id,t , and μ) takes the public parameters PP, an identity id ∈ I, a time t ∈ T, a signing key SK id,t , and a message μ ∈ U as input and outputs a signature σ. Verify(PP, id, t, μ, and σ) takes the public parameters PP and an identity id ∈ I, a time t ∈ T, and a message/ signature pair (μ, σ) as input and outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject). KeyRev(id, t, RL, and ST) takes a revoked identity id ∈ I, a time t ∈ T, a revocation list RL, and a state ST as input and outputs an updated revocation list RL. is is stateful and run by the key authority.
Correctness.
e correctness requires that for all λ ∈ N, polynomials N, all (PP, MSK) output by Setup, all μ ∈ U, id ∈ I, t ∈ T, and all possible valid states ST and revocation lists RL, if identity id is not revoked in time t, then for
Next, we provide a security definition of the RIBS scheme that captures realistic threats including signing key exposure.
Definition 6 (EUF-sID-CMA). e selective-ID essential unforgeable against chosen message attacks (EUF-sID-CMA) security model of the RIBS scheme is defined via the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C.
Initial: the adversary A first outputs the challenge identity id * , time t * , and also some information state it wants to preserve. Setup: the challenger runs Setup to generate public parameters PP, a master secret key MSK, a revocation list RL (initial empty), and a state ST. It gives PP to the adversary and keeps MSK secret. Query: A may make some queries as follows:
(i) PriKeyGen Query: on receiving a private key query, the challenger runs PriKeyGen to return a private key to A (ii) Key Update Query: on receiving an update key query, the challenger runs KeyUpd to return an update key KU t to A (iii) Revocation Query: on receiving a revocation query, the challenger runs KeyRev to return an update list RL to A (iv) SignKeyGen Query: on receiving a signing key query for an identity and a time, the challenger runs PriKeyGen and KeyUpd to return a signing key to A (v) Signature Query: on receiving a signature query for a chosen message, an identity, and a time, the challenger runs Sign to return a signature to A Forgery: at the end of the game, A outputs a forgery of a message/signature pair on the behalf of the identity id * in the time period t * . If A satisfies the following four conditions, then it wins the above game:
(i) Verify(PP, id * , t * , μ * , σ * ) � 1 (ii) Key Update Query and Revocation Query can be queried on time which is greater than or equal to the time of all previous queries (iii) Revocation Query cannot be queried on time t if Key Update Query was queried on t (iv) If PriKeyGen Query was queried for identity id * , then the Revocation Query must be queried for identity id * on time t ≤ t * (v) SignKeyGen Query cannot be queried on time t before Key Update Query was queried on t (vi) SignKeyGen Query cannot be queried for identity id * on time t * (vii) Signature Query cannot be queried for challenge message μ * under identity id * on time t * e probability of winning the above game is the advantage of A. If there does not exist any PPT adversary who has nonnegligible advantage in the above game, then the RIBS scheme is EUF-sID-CMA secure.
Our Scalable RIBS Scheme
In our RIBS scheme, a user's signing key is generated from a private key and periodical update key. e PKG periodically generates update keys and sends them to the nonrevoked users. After obtaining the update keys, the nonrevoked users can generate a valid signing key with their private key. In the process of constructing our RIBS, it is a challenging technical difficulty that a valid signing key should be guaranteed as a certain lattice space's short basis which is used as a trapdoor to sample vectors. In order to solve this difficulty, we improve the preimage sampling algorithm and redefine it as the SampleSubInv algorithm. erefore, in the following, we first introduce the SampleSubInv algorithm and then we give the concrete construction of RIBS and provide the process of proving its security. roughout the section, the function H 0 refers to the FRD map H 0 : Z n q ⟶ Z n×n q (if id ∈ 0, 1 { } * , it can be hashed into Z n q by using a collision resistant hash). Hash function H 1 is a random oracle that outputs matrices in Z 3m×3m , namely,
SampleSubInv Algorithm. Algorithm SampleSubInv (A, M, T A , U, and s): the algorithm takes a rank n matrix
q , and a parameter s ∈ R >0 as input and works as follows:
(2) Let T ∈ Z m×m be the matrix whose columns are t 1 , . . . , t m . Output T Note that AT � U, and matrix T − M is invertible. e analysis of algorithm SampleSubInv uses Corollary 3.16 of literature [30] which shows that a linearly independent set is produced in step (1a) w.h.p. after m 2 samples from SamplePre(A, T A , u i , s). It is not difficult to show that only 2m samples are needed in expectation.
Construction. Our concrete scalable RIBS scheme with signing key resistance works as follows:
Setup(1 λ , N): the setup algorithm takes a security parameter λ and a maximal number of users N as input and proceeds as follows:
(1) Pick Gaussian parameters s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 and set the parameters n � n(λ), q � q(n), and m � m(n). ese parameters are implicitly known to all of the algorithms below. (2) Sample l + 3 random matrices: A 1 , A 2 , B, D i i∈ [l] in Z n×m q , where l is the length of message. PriKeyGen(PP, MSK, id, and ST): this algorithm takes as input the public parameters PP, a master secret key MSK, an identity id ∈ 0, 1 { } * , and a state ST. en it picks an unassigned leaf node ν from BT, stores id in that node, and performs the following steps:
(1) For each node θ ∈ Path(]), pick random matrix U θ ∈ Z n×m q and store it in node θ
, E ] , R 1 , ST) KeyUpd(PP, MSK, t, RL, and ST): this algorithm takes the public parameters PP, a master secret key MSK, a time t ∈ 0, 1 { } * , a revocation list RL, and a state ST as input and proceeds as follows: RL, and t) and
where KUNodes(BT, RL, and t) is an algorithm KUNodes from [4] (
SignKeyGen(SK id and KU t ): this algorithm takes a private key SK id and an update key KU t as input and runs the following steps:
(3) Generate SK id,t ′ by running Lemma 4 which takes S id,t as input (S id,t is an invertible matrix with some norm which will be proved in the eorem 1). en, run the algorithm BasisDel(A id,t , R id,t , SK id,t ′ , s 2 ) to generate SK id,t and output SK id,t .
Sign(PP, id, t, SK id,t , and μ): the signing algorithm takes the public parameters PP, an identity id, a time t, a signing key SK id,t , and a message μ � (μ(1), . . . , μ(l)) ∈ 0, 1 { } l as input and outputs signature σ as follows:
Security and Communication Networks 5 , t, μ, and σ) : the verify algorithm takes the public parameters PP, an identity id ∈ 0, 1 { } * , a time t ∈ 0, 1 { } * , and a pair of message/signature (μ, σ) as input and accepts only if the following conditions are satisfied:
RL, and ST): this algorithm takes a revoked identity id, a time t, a revocation list RL, and a state ST as input and adds (id, t) to RL for all nodes ν associated with identity id and returns RL.
Theorem 1. S id,t is an invertible matrix with small norm.
Proof. First, we show that S id,t is a small norm matrix. From the construction, we know that
which are small norm matrices. en, we can get ||S id,t || ≤ max 4s 1 �� m √ , �� m √ (s 1 + α R ) . Second, we will show S id,t is an invertible matrix. For matrix S id,t , we make an elementary transformation and finally obtain C ≔
, and by the SampleSubInv algorithm in the KeyGen phase, we can see E j, 1 ′ − (H j ′ − H i ) is an invertible matrix. Because R 1 and R 2 are Z q -invertible matrices, then C is invertible and then S id,t is an invertible matrix. In summary, S id,t is an invertible matrix with small norm. e correctness equality in Verify follows from the SampleLeft algorithm. In order to ensure the correctness and security of the above construction, we set the following: 6 , 2Q , where λ is the security parameter.
Security.
e following theorem shows that our scalable RIBS scheme is secure.
Theorem 2.
e construction of the scalable RIBS scheme is EUF-sID-CMA secure provided that the SIS q,n,m,β assumption holds.
Proof. Assume A wins the game in Section 3 and Q is the signing queries maximum number. We can construct a solver B that provides a valid solution to the SIS problem. A first gives the target identity and time (id * , t * ). B is given a random instance of the (q, n, m, and β) -SIS problem and is asked to return an admissible solution. at is, (i) Provided: a matrix A 0 from Z n×3m q 's uniform distribution (ii) Returned: any vector e 0 ∈ Z 3m such that A 0 e 0 � 0 modq and 0 ≠ ‖e 0 ‖ ≤ β B performs as follows:
Setup * (1 λ , N, l) : B provides the adversary A with simulated parameters as follows:
(1) Run algorithm TrapGen to obtain (B, T B ) ⟵ TrapGen(1 n , 1 m , q) (2) Choose l + 3 random matrices U 0 , U 1 , U 2 ∼ D m×m and R * i ∼ D Z m ,η and also choose l random
(3) Output the parameters PP � (A, A 1 , A 2 , B, and
PriKeyGen Query and Key Update Query: B first picks a node ] * ∈ BT and allots it to id * . It is worth noting that there will be two types of adversaries:
(i) Type (a) adversaries are revoked users and can challenge the target identity id * before or on time t * (ii) Type (b) adversaries cannot challenge the target identity id * at any time B picks a bit rev $ ⟵ 0, 1 { } randomly as a guess for the type of adversarial behavior. Clearly, the probability of B's correct guesses is 1/2. Type (a) adversaries (rev � 0): B simulates each node θ's matrix U θ as follows:
are statistically close to Z n×2m q 's uniform distribution by leftover hash lemma, then all the above U θ are statistically close to uniform over Z n×m q ; when rev � 1, for each node θ, U θ is generated either through or through
No matter which case, we can have R 1 ∼ D m×m and R 2 ∼ D m×m and E ] * � − U 1 · R 1 and E t * � − U 2 · R 2 . Since the distribution of R 1 and R 2 are Gaussian distribution, then the distribution of E ] * and E t * is statistically close to Gaussian distribution. In conclusion, the distribution of the simulated system is statistically close to the real system.
For id ≠ id * 's private key queries and t ≠ t * 's update key queries, B uses the trapdoor
From the definition of FRD, H 0 (id) − H 0 (id * ) and H 0 (t) − H 0 (t * ) are nonsingular. en, B runs the sampleRightExt algorithm and generates id ≠ id * 's private key
where s 2 ′ > ‖T B ‖ · s U 1 · ω( ���� � log m ). Moreover, B samples R 1 ′ ⟵ D m×m and calls algorithm RandBasis(T B , s 4 ) from [28] . It can obtain , E ] , R 1 . For all t ≠ t * 's update key
where s 2 ′ > ||T B || · s U 2 · ω( ���� � log m ). Moreover, it samples R 2 ′ ⟵ D m×m and then calls algorithm RandBasis(T B , s 4 
and then generates the update key θ,
, E t , R 2 .
Since the parameter s 2 ′ is sufficiently large, E θ,1 's distribution is statistically close to D versary A asks the signing key on identity id * and time t ≠ t * , B runs SampleRwithBasis(G) to obtain a random R id * ,t ∼ D 3m×3m and a short basis T F id * ,t for F id * ,t � GR id * ,t modq. en, it saves the tuple (id * | t, R id * ,t , F id * ,t , T F id * ,t ) in list L for future use and returns T F id * ,t to the adversary A. If the adversary A asks the signing key on identity id ≠ id * and time t, B retrieves the list L and checks whether i d|t in L. If (id | t, R id,t , F id,t , T F id,t ) is in L, B returns T F id,t to A. Otherwise, B also runs SampleRwithBasis(G) to obtain a random R id,t ∼ D 3m×3m and a short basis T F id,t for F id,t � GR id,t modq. en, it saves the tuple (id | t, R id,t , F id,t , T F id,t ) in list L for future use and returns T F id,t to the adversary A. In the real SignKeyGen phase, the signing keys are generated by using algorithm BasisDel. In the Simulated signing key queries, the signing keys are generated from algorithm SampleRwithBasis. By Lemma 7 and 8, the responses to H 1 oracle queries and signing key queries are as in the real system.
Signature Queries. B simulates signatures of messages μ for A's adaptive signature queries as follows:
(i) If the queried messages μ are under target identity id * in target time t * , B answers as follows:
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(2) If h μ � 0 (mod q), abort the simulation (3) Otherwise sample vector:
(ii) If the queried messages μ are under identity id ≠ id * or in time t ≠ t * , B first retrieves the list L and checks whether it has tuple (id | t, R id,t , F id,t , T F id,t ). If yes, B gets T F id,t and samples vector σ ⟵ SampleLeft
. Otherwise, B also runs SampleRwithBasis(G) to obtain a random R id,t ∼ D 3m×3m and a short basis T F id,t for F id,t � GR id,t modq. en, it saves the tuple (id | t, R id,t , F id,t , T F id,t ) in list L and uses T F id,t to sample algorithm σ ⟵ SampleLeft(F id,t , A 0 R μ + h μ B, T F id,t , 0, s 2 ′ ). At last, B returns σ to the adversary A.
Forgery: B obtains a forged signature σ * on an unqueried message μ * and performs the following:
, e 0 is small and nonzero with good probability and is a valid (q, n, m, β)-SIS solution with good probability.
Lemma 9.
If A provides a valid forgery (σ * T 1 | σ * T 2 ) T for message μ * with h μ * � 0 (mod q), then for polynomial function β � poly(l, n, m) � poly(λ), e 0 � σ *
Since σ * is message μ * 's valid signature under identity id * in time t * , then we can obtain
Next, we will show that e 0 is appropriately short. Since R μ * is the sum of l low-norm matrices
nearly independent with the same variance V R * 1 and their coefficients are in 0, 1 { }, then we will have
In particular, since they are almost independent discrete Gaussian,
Finally, it remains to show that e 0 ≠ 0. Suppose an easy case that σ * 2 � 0, then for a valid forgery, it must have σ * 1 ≠ 0, thus e 0 ≠ 0. On the contrary, σ * 2 ≠ 0, since ‖σ * 2 ‖ < ��� 4m √ · s 2 ≪ q; thus, there must be at least one σ * 2 's coordinate that is nonzero modulo q. We set z be σ * 4 's last one coordinate. Let r * be R μ * 's last column and r * i be R * i 's last column for each i ∈ [l]. en, we have r * � l i�1 (− 1) μ * (i) r * i , where the coefficients depend on the message bits. For r * 1 , let v � (− 1) μ * (1) zr * 1 , then e 0 � zr * + e 0 ′ � v + e ″ 0 , where v depends on r * 1 and e ″ 0 does not. e only information about r * 1 available to A is contained in the last column of D 1 's last column. From a simple pigeonhole principle, there exists many admissible and equally likely vector r * 1 that are the same with A's view. A cannot know the value of zr * 1 with probability exceeding once third, then every other zr * 1 would fail to do so.
us, Pr e 0 ≠ 0 ≥ 1/2 m(m− 1) . If A forges a signature with probability ε with Q ≤ q/2, then the algorithm B can solve the SIS(n, m, q, β) problem with the advantage
We will show that the simulation (without aborting) is statistically indistinguishable from the real system. e differences of the algorithms are summarized as follows:
(i) In real Setup, matrix A ∈ Z n×m q is sampled from the algorithm TrapGen. Matrices (A 1 , A 2 , B, and D i i∈ [l] ) are chosen uniformly at random. In sim- We now argue that the distribution (A, A 1 , A 2 , B , D i i∈ [l] ) is statistically indistinguishable in the two experiments. Let
en, from Lemma 2, we have 8
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for random matrices A, A ′ from Z n×m q , Z n×(l+2)m q and
chosen at random. Here, B's distribution is statistically close to Z n×m q 's uniform distribution. erefore, the distribution of PP in the simulation is statistically indistinguishable to them in the real system.
For each μ's signature query, if Gaussian parameters s 3 and s 3 ′ are sufficiently large, then the outputs' distributions of SampleLeft and SampleRight are statistically close.
At last, since the SIS problem is as hard as approximating to the worst-case shortest independent vector problem from [29] , the adversary A cannot succeed in attacking our scalable RIBS scheme.
Comparisons
is section will be divided into two parts to evaluate the performance of our RIBS scheme: first efficiency and second functionality.
Efficiency Comparisons.
Here, we emphasis that since our scheme is built upon lattices, which is different from other listed schemes ( [20] [21] [22] ) based on bilinear maps or 3-linear maps, the running times in our scheme and in other listed map-based schemes may be different. us, when we discuss the computation cost, we only focus on the number of the corresponding operations and give comparisons with the lattice-based schemes ( [10, 11] ). First, since in scheme [11] , the authors adopted the ideal lattice (NTRU lattice) to generate a user's signing key, it is obvious that both the signing key and signature sizes of their scheme are less than those of both Xiang's RIBS [10] and ours RIBS schemes. Next, for the computation cost of signing, in Xiang's RIBS scheme, it requires 2NmT m + T sp to obtain a signature, where T sp is the cost of executing the SamplePre algorithm. In scheme [11] , it requires 7(N 2 + 2N)T m to obtain a signature, where T m is the cost of executing a multiplication operation in Z q . In our RIBS scheme, it needs O(9m 2 n + lmn)T + + O(m 2 n)T m + T inv + T sl level time to obtain a signature, where T + is the cost of executing an addition operation in Z q , T inv is the cost of executing a matrix inversion operation in Z 3m×3m , and T sl is the cost of executing the SampleLeft algorithm. For the computation cost of verifying, three schemes require 3NmT m , (N 2 + N)T m and O(mn)T m + O(lmn)T + , respectively, to verify a signature. Since m > 6N log q, it is obvious that the ideal lattice-based scheme [11] has higher efficiency in terms of the computation costs of signing and verifying. Finally, since our RIBS scheme employs the binary tree to revoke users, the authority's workload performing the update procedure is the logarithm of nonrevoked users. In Xiang's RIBS scheme, it also employs the binary tree to revoke users. But it then uses secure channels to send periodic signing keys to nonrevoked users, and it will make the authority having linearity level workload. In scheme [11] , the authority's workload is linearity of nonrevoked users (Table 1) . · ω( ������ log 4 m ); |G| or |G 2 | is the size of an element in the group G or G 2 ; p and e denote a pairing operation and an exponentiation operation, respectively; T + is the cost of executing an addition operation in Z q ; T m is the cost of executing a multiplication operation in Z q ; T sp is the cost of executing the Samplepre algorithm in [23] ; T inv is the cost of executing a matrix inversion operation in Z 3m×3m ; T sl is the cost of executing the Sampleleft algorithm in [27] ; ∅ denotes that the workload of the authority performing the update procedure is independent of the number of nonrevoked users. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed the first scalable RIBS scheme with signing key exposure resistance over lattices, in which the update keys are broadcast regularly over public channels. en, we proved its EUF-sID-CMA security under the SIS assumption. In the future, we intend to improve the efficiency of the lattice-based RIBS with signing key exposure resistance.
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